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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH

*

CaseNo.20100188-CA

*
*

Plaintiff/Appellee
*
*

Vs.

Appellate Brief

*
*

ROBERT FERRETTI

*

Defendant/ Appellant

*

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Appellant is appealing from the denial of his motion to withdraw
his guilty made prior to sentencing in the First District Court for Cache
County, Utah, violations of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and
breach of a plea bargain. The defendant pled guilty to Murder, a First Degree
Felony. He was sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of fifteen yeairs to
life in the Utah State Prison. Jurisdiction for the Appeal is conferred upon
the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY
PLEA?
PRESERVATION IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was preserved for
appeal by the timely making a motion to withdraw his plea (R. 315), and
hearings and a ruling on that motion (R. 315).
Standard of Review: A district court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea involves both factual and legal determinations, and thus invites
multiple standards of review. State v. Beckstead, 140 p.3d 1288 (UT 2006).
The Court will overturn a district court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea only when we are convinced that the court has abused its
discretion. We will disturb findings of fact made in connection with a ruling
on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea only if they are clearly erroneous.
The ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied
with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a
question of law which is reviewed for correction. The correction standard
often displaces the abuse of discretion standard because a strict compliance

2

violation will almost certainly constitute an abuse of discretion. State v.
Lovell, 2010 UT 48.
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN THE FAILED TO
ALLOW DEFENSE COUNSEL SUFFICIENT TIME TO FILE A
FORMAL MOTION TO WITHDRAW MR. FERRETTFS GUILTY PLEA
AND REQUIRED THE LEGALLY UNTRAINED DEFENDANT TO
ARTICULATE A GOOD FAITH BASIS TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA
PRESERVATION IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was preserved in the
trial court by the defense counsel making a timely objection to proceeding.
R-315
Standard of Review is correctness and abuse of discretion. The Court may
grant the trial court a reasonable measure of discretion when applying the
law to the facts. State v. Byington, 936 P.2d 112, 1115 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)

III. DID THE STATE VIOLATE THE PLEA AGREEMENT
WHEN THEY FAILED TO WRITE A TIMELY LETTER TO THE
BOARD OF PARDONS TO RECOMMEND THE BOARD OF PARDONS
CONSIDER THE FACT MR. FERRETTI PLEAD GUILTY IN
EVALUATING HIS RELEASE DATE. The Standard of Review is plain
error and exceptional circumstances. State v. Weaver, 122 P.3d 566 (Utah
2005) three circumstances where an issue may be addressed for the first
time on appeal are plain error, exceptional circumstances, and
ineffective assistance of counsel). A defendant who pleads guilty has a
constitutional right to a remedy when a plea agreement is broken.
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CONSTITUTION AL PROVISIONS, S I A II" I UN, AP IP It"I"I ¥S
111 A i m >I)H ANNt)TATM)

:

'

' '

76-5-203 Murder, a first degree felony. A person commits Murder
when the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another.
77-13-6 Withdrawal of plea. (1) A plea of guilty may be withdrawn at
any time prior to conviction.
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave
of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily
made.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a
plea held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is
announced. Sentence may not be announced unless the motion is
denied...
Law prior to the 2003 change
77-13-6 Withdrawal of plea. (1) A plea of guilty may be withdrawn at
any time prior to conviction.
2(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good
cause shown and with leave of the court.

78-2a-3(2)(e) Court of Appeals J ur i s di c tioii
(2) The Court of Appeals has 111>|n;11 Ji(c pins<11cdmi, 1111 • 111c 1111v ji irisdiction
of interlocutory appeals, over:
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases except those
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule I
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open
court. The defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant
has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel.
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(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by
reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in
the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a
defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to
appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall
forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be
given a preference for an early trial. In cases other than felonies the
court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for
making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty
and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has
knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of
innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to
a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and
cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to
compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the
plea, these rights are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the
offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution
would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those
elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is
sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually
committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise
unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence
to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
5

(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and
plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any
motion to withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant liiis been jiKiscd tkil (In iirlil A iippuil \>
limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court
has established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged
the contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the
English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read
< ; ranslated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required
to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a
plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally
ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for
extending the time to make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g) If the defendant pleads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally
ill to a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code
Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in
writing that, as a result of the plea, it is unlawful for the defendant
to possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure
to advise does not render the plea invalid or form the basis for
withdrawal of the plea.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 17, 2009 the Defendant was charged with Murder, a first
degree felony in violation of UCA § 76-5-203, and Obstruction of Justice a
second degree felony in violation of UCA § 76-8-306(c). R. 01. On June
26, 2009 a preliminary hearing was held. R. 75. On July 14, 2009 he was
arraigned on the charge by the court. R. 82. The defendant had been
incarcerated 329 days awaiting his trial and the scheduled arraignment. R305:29. The Defendant pled guilty to the charge on January 11, 2010 (R.
298) and on February 10, 2010. R. 315. just prior to being sentenced he
made a motion to withdraw his plea.
The Court asked the defendant directly his legal basis for the
withdrawal. R. 315:11. The Court heard oral arguments and denied his
motion and sentenced him to an indetenninate term in the Utah State Prison
of not less than fifteen years to life. R. 306. The Defendant filed a notice of
appeal on March 3, 2010. R. 310.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 8, 2008, a body was discovered up Logan Canyon and
identified as that of Tiffany Britt Jarmon. Initial autopsy and coroner
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examinations determined that the victim had suffered a gunshot w 01 it id to
"III1 llCcUl . i p p r O M I l l i i l d s

1

\\\i*

\ U " l ' l > p i l ' H (<""" N(»\ iMllhi'i X, ,"!(KIX

R- ill

1

1 he initial investiga tion led police to suspect the defendant, Robert

Ferretti, as a suspect involved in the death of the victim. On Januar) 16,
2009, police contacted the defendant and interviewed him regarding his
relationship with the victim and his possible involvement in her homicide.
Defendant deniecu.... .;arge <
S•

.. *

' *• *

'*

-

is of the police !^:

vehicle previously belonging to Robert Ferretti was found to contain blood
stains which matched DNA samples taken from the victim. R-305:7.
After the discovery of the DNA correlation police attempted to
contact the defendant, only to find he had leit the Sail Lake area, i,
apparent (lit; defendant kid ilquilnl in k»sli\ ki\

IIIJJ

as

nol e u n i/olit/1 Inl his

final pa) cl leek froi n 1 lis employ ei R 305:7.
On March 12, 2009, Robert Underwood, an associate of the defendant
living in Pueblo, Colorado, contacted the Cache County Sheriffs Office
regarding conversations he had had with the defendant regarding the murder
of the victim. Mr. Underwood stated that I lie defendant had informed i
details rci'aixliiiii Ins shoolinjj ol'llir \ uliiii as \\c\\ u nlhu' inrnin \ ... .
coi robora tions of Detecti \ e'Bar tschi's investiga tion R -305:8
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Having reviewed the facts of the case with the Cache County
Attorney's Office, Detective Bartschi obtained an arrest warrant from the
First District Court on March 13, 2009. Detective Bartschi then contacted
law enforcement in Pueblo, Colorado and advised them of the warrant for
defendant's arrest. They arrested the defendant during a traffic stop on
March 13, 2009 and he was returned to Utah on March 24, 2009. R-305:8.
Defendant has remained incarcerated since March 2009. Previous to
the date set for trial the Defendant reached a plea agreement with the State
of Utah and entered a Plea in First District Court, Cache County, State of
Utah to one Count of Murder, a 1st Degree Felony. The State agreed to
dismiss Count Two of Defendant's charges, Obstruction of Justice and write
a letter to the Board asking them to consider the fact he pled guilty as
mitigation in determining his parole date. R-281:4.
Defendant entered his Plea of Guilty on January 11, 2010 before the
Honorable Judge Kevin K. Allen of the First District Court, Cache County,
State of Utah. At that time Defendant was informed that his Plea would
waive certain rights granted him by the Constitutions of the United States
and Utah. Defendant was informed the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he had intentionally or knowingly caused the death of
another and was asked if he understood, and his initial reply was yes. R-314.
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The Defendant did not understand that by admitting guilt he was
admitting each and every element of the State's charge against him,
including that he knowingly and intentionally killed the victim. R-314. The
Judge did not make that clear.
At the conclusion of the hearing Defendant addressed the Court in
which the following dialogue took place:
MR. FERRETTI: Your Honor, I would like to say that I
never intended initially for Ms. Jarman to die and I
apologize to the family and—and to the State for any
troubles that I've caused, and grief.
THE COURT: Did you knowingly and intentionally take
her life, Mr. Ferretti?
MR. FERRETTI: I have trouble saying yes, I did. I was
under the influence of drugs and alcohol at the time and
we were in an argument.
THE COURT: Mr. Ferretti, I understand that, but by so
stating and we've already gone over all of this, but I'm
going to go over it again, in order for me to accept your
plea, I understand that you were under the influence of
drugs or alcohol, but when you committed the act that
you did by shooting her in the head, did you understand
that that would be—that you would be taking her life?
MR. FERRETTI: Yes.

A pre-sentence investigation report was prepared and the defendant
explained what happened on the night in question. Mr. Ferretti said, "One
night Tiffany had called me and asked me if I could pick her up. I told her
that I had been drinking and that I didn't think it was a good idea. She said
please and I said yes. I picked her up at 7/11 on 2100 South and State Street.
10

We drove to a friend of mine's house to get some meth. I left Tiffany in the
truck and came out a couple of minutes later. We drove away from there
parked and got high. I started driving on 1-15 north. She says why do I
think I am better than her. I told her that I didn't We started arguing and I
told her I didn't think we should see each other any more she screams "fuck
you" and pulls out a gun puts it to my crotch and says maybe she should
blow my balls off. I push the gun forward and bam it goes off. As I am
freaking out and driving on the highway we are quarrelling with the gun. I
hear another shot and there is blood everywhere." R-305:17
The case proceeded to Sentencing on February 10, 2010. At that time
Defendant informed the Court that he would like to withdraw his Plea of
Guilty. R-315:3.
Initially the Court granted two weeks in order to articulate in a Motion
the cause of his decision to see whether in fact there were grounds for
withdrawing his plea. R-315:4-7.
After a brief recess the State requested that the Defendant demonstrate
to the Court that his original plea was not made either knowingly or
voluntarily and requested a good faith basis to justify granting the motion.
Defendant's counsel asked for the previously granted time in order to put
forth a coherent articulation a good faith basis for the motion and address
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Defendant's concerns with his entering a plea of guilt. The State objected to
the continuance, believing that the Defendant had no good faith reason to
withdraw his plea. R-315:8-11.
The Court expressed agreement with the State's objection and
proceeded to solicit a justification from the Defendant for a good faith basis
on which to grant the Defendant time to articulate a motion. R-315:11.
Defendant, without any prior legal experience or training, then
proceeded to articulate his reasoning for withdrawing his guilty plea.
Defendant cited his confusion with certain aspects of the wording contained
in his Plea agreement. Specifically, the Defendant, in admitting guilt, did not
realize he was admitting to intentionally causing the death of the victim, a
claim he resisted in his statements. R-315:12-13.
The Court then proceeded to go through the Rule 11 waiver in which
Defendant had admitted to having intentionally or knowingly caused the
death of the victim. Defendant maintained that he did not understand the
nature of his plea relating to intentionally and/or knowingly causing the
victim's death. R-315:14-21.
During the hearing to withdraw his plea Mr. Ferretti stated: I really
don't know how to explain it, but beyond—they have to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that I intentionally did that and I—I didn't—maybe I didn't
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fully understand, but I am stating at this time I did not intentionally and/or
knowingly cause the death of this girl. R.315:14.
The Court then denied Defendant's Motion to withdraw his plea on
the grounds that Defendant had not been able to articulate a good faith basis
as to why his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made at the time. R315:21.
The Court imposed a Sentence of not less than 15 years and which
may be for life. R-315:43.
The Defendants attorney filed Notice of appeal on the 3rd day of
March, 2010.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Defendant argues that under the constitutions of both the state
and federal government as well as Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the court cannot accept a plea of guilty until the defendant has
knowingly and voluntarily admitted to and understands all the elements of
the charges. The requirement that a Defendant's plea must be knowingly
and voluntary has its basis in both constitutional and statutory law, as well as
under the general principle of justice. The Court must insure the defendant
knows that by pleading guilty he admits to all the elements of the charges. In
the present case the Defendant believes that these basic guarantees of justice
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were denied him. In this case the defendant did not clearly understand that
by pleading guilty he was admitting that he knowingly and intentional
caused the death of Tiffany Jarmon. There was considerable ambiguity in his
plea. The defendant contests he never knowingly and intentionally caused
the death of Tiffany Jarmon. The court did not strictly comply with Rule 11.
The court never asked him that he understood by pleading guilty he was
admitting to all the elements of the charge. The court abused it's discretion
by not allowing him to withdraw his plea.
The court forced the defendant to act as his own attorney when it
denied a continuance to allow his court-appointed attorney's time to
articulate a good faith basis to withdraw his plea. The defendant was denied
due process by the denial of his motion to continue and his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel under both the Utah and United States
constitution.
As part of the plea agreement the State agreed to write a letter to the
Board asking them to consider the fact he pled guilty as mitigation in
determining his parole date. R-281:4 The defendant's initial review before
the board was in March 1, 2010. This was three months after the State made
the agreement. The Board never received the letter until July 6, 2010. The
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letter was untimely. This violation constituted a breach of the plea
agreement and the remedy should be withdrawal of the defendant's plea.
The cumulative effect of failure of the court to strictly comply with
Rule 11 and ensuring the defendant understood that by pleading guilty he
was admitting to all the elements of murder, the denial of due process and
the right to counsel, and the failure of the State to comply with the plea
agreement constitute cumulative error. The remedy should be withdrawal of
defendant's plea.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION.
On January 11, 2010, the Defendant entered a guilty plea as charged
to the first-degree felony murder charge. On or about February 10, 2010 the
Defendant moved the trial court to allow him to withdraw that plea. The trial
court held a hearing on the Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. The
trial court denied the Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.
Mr. Ferretti maintains that he did not knowingly and intentionally kill
Tiffany Jarmon. The elements of the crime of murder are that one must
knowingly and intentionally take the life of another. R-l
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This Court must determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied the Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. " The withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a privilege, not a right. The
granting of a pre-sentence motion to withdraw a plea of guilty is within the
sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah
1987) Because "the entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of several
important constitutional rights" and "because the prosecution will generally
be unable to show that it will suffer any significant prejudice if the plea is
withdrawn, a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should in general
be liberally granted, (emphasis added) State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040,
1040-42(Utah 1987) State v. Ruiz 210 P3d 955(Utah App. 2009). The party
"who would set a plea aside has the burden of proving that there is a legal
ground for doing so, but the burden is relatively low (emphasis added) in a
pre-sentence setting. State v. Gallegos 738 P.2d at 1042.
The trial court should have allowed Mr. Ferretti to withdraw his
plea, sufficient grounds being present to justify its approval. He made
the motion prior to being sentenced so it is timely. He has articulated
the reasons why he felt his plea should be withdrawn. He maintains
that he did not knowingly or intentionally kill the victim. When he
entered his plea he stated, in response to the Court's question, "Did
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you knowingly and intentionally take her life?" He answered, "I have
trouble saying yes, I did. I was under the influence of drugs and
alcohol at the time and we were in an argument." At that point the
Court should have simply proceeded to trial rather than accept his
guilty plea. Both parties were prepared to proceed, it was the time set
for trial.
The Courts have stated that the withdrawal of a guilty plea should be
liberally granted. The trial court should have allowed Mr. Ferretti to
withdraw his plea. Id. Gallegoes. The State's case would not be prejudiced
by the court having done so.
Where the Courts have articulated the burden is relatively low in a
pre-sentence setting to allow a plea to be withdrawn the trial court should
have granted the defendant's request. Mr. Ferretti claims he did not
knowingly or intentionally kill Ms. Jarmon. He did not understand thait by
pleading guilty he was admitting to all the elements of the crime of murder.
While the Court partially complied with Rule 11 on this matter they never
asked the question whether he understood that by pleading guilty he was
admitting to all the elements of the crime.
Rule 11 (e)(4)(A) states, "the defendant understands the nature and elements
of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution
would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those
17

elements; See State v. Morgan, 210 UT App 262 (September 2010)

While the court did ask the defendant if he understood the nature and
elements of the offense and the prosecution would have the burden of
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, the court never
did inquire if he understood that the plea is an admission of all those
elements. Mr. Ferretti denies that he knowingly or intentionally caused the
death of Tiffany Jarmon. When he pled guilty he did not realize he was
admitting that he knowingly or intentionally caused the death of Ms. Jarmon.
A strict compliance violation will almost certainly constitute an abuse of
discretion. State v. Lovell, 2010 UT 48.
For a plea of guilty to be valid it must appear that the accused has a
clear understanding of the charge and knowingly and voluntarily entered
such plea. Good cause is shown when the defendant does not knowingly
and voluntarily enter the plea agreement. State v. Ruiz, 210P.3d955 (Ut.
App. 2009). Mr. Ferretti has demonstrated that he did not knowingly and
voluntarily enter the plea. He could not clearly affirm to the Court that he
possessed the necessary elements of knowingly or intentionally causing the
death.
The Court had the pre-sentence report in hand when the defendant
made his motion to withdraw his plea. He knew the defendant had not
18

admitted to knowingly or intentionally causing death of the Ms. Jarmon.
The statement made by Mr. Ferretti in the pre-sentence report sets forth facts
that are more consistent with an accidental taking of life. He stated, "he told
her that they shouldn't see each other anymore and she screams "fuck you"
and pulls out a gun puts is to his crotch and says maybe she should blow my
balls off. He then pushed the gun forward and bam it went off. As I am
freaking out and driving down the highway we are quarrelling with the gun.
I hear another shot and there is blood everywhere." R-305:17. The facts
stated by the defendant do not suggest that he knowingly or intentionally
took the life of Ms. Jarmon. The court should have granted the defendant's
motion and allowed him to have a trial.
In State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371 (Utah 1996), the trial court was
found to have abused it's discretion when it failed to allow the defendant to
withdraw his guilty plea, although the defendant acknowledged at one point
that aggravated murder by means of a bomb required an intentional or
knowing killing, given his repeated statements that he did not intend to kill
the victim and his specific refusal to admit that he knew the bomb would
cause death, the defendant failed to admit facts to which he pleaded guilty.
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The law on the standard to withdraw a guilty plea was changed in
2003 under Utah Code Ann section 77-13-6. The former law required the
defendant to show good cause in order to withdraw his plea. The current
law requires the defendant to show that the plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily made.
During the plea colloquy the trial court informed the defendant as to
his rights to withdraw his plea under the old standard in effect prior to 2003.
The court stated/' Mr. Ferretti, do you understand that you may request to
withdraw your guilty plea at any time prior to sentencing or forfeit the right
to do so? A motion to withdraw your guilty plea would only be granted
upon good cause and is within the discretion of the court.
In the written Notice of plea bargain, Rule 11 Waiver/Statement of
Facts. R-293 it states," A motion to withdraw a guilty plea will only be
granted upon good cause and is within the discretion of the Court." In the
Statement of Defendant in support of Guilty plea, it states, " I understand
that if I want to withdraw my guilty plea I must file a written, motion to
withdraw my plea within 30 days after I have been sentenced and final
judgment has been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I
show good cause.
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This misstatement of the law error further emphasizes the Court did
error in accepting the defendant's plea.
The Court abused it's discretion by not fully complying with Rule 11
of Rules of Criminal Procedure. They abused their discretion when they
accepted the plea knowing the defendant did not fully admit to intentionally
and knowingly causing the death of the victim and further abused their
discretion for not allowing Mr. Ferretti to withdraw his plea after he was
able to demonstrate he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter the plea.
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN THE FAILED TO
ALLOW DEFENSE COUNSEL SUFFICIENT TIME TO FILE A
FORMAL MOTION TO WITHDRAW MR. FERRETTFS GUILTY PLEA
AND REQUIRED THE LEGALLY UNTRAINED DEFENDANT TO
ARTICULATE A GOOD FAITH BASIS TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA

The defendant, Mr. Ferretti was denied his right to due process and
counsel in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Utah and
United States Constitutions. The court required Mr. Ferretti, in essence act
as his own lawyer in articulating a good faith basis to withdraw his plea. R315:11. This requirement violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to counsel under the Utah and United States Constitutions. Initially the court
allowed defense counsel some time to prepare a written motion and
memorandum in support of the motion, the court then changed it's mind and
made the defendant articulate a good faith basis, right then on his own as to
21

why his plea should be withdrawn. R 315:4-7. This requirement of the court
violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights to Due process and Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.

Defense counsel objected and stated: He's not a legal
expert, he doesn't have any legal training or anything
such as that and so, actually, having him express the
foundation for his desire to withdraw his guilty plea is
something of a legal argument for which he is not
trained. I think it would be more prudent course to
actually allow him, with the aid of counsel, to go through
all the documentation that was signed on the date and
establish grounds, if any in fact do exist. But I think that
puts Mr. Ferretti almost in a position to make a legal
argument for which he's notirained at this time. R 315:9
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
every criminal defendant the right to assistance of counsel as well as the
right to self-representation. State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (UT 1987).
To waive the right to counsel, a defendant must "clearly and unequivocally"
request self-representation.

Before honoring a defendant's decision to

appear pro se, a trial court must determine whether that choice is being made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. See State v. Pedockie, 95 P.3d
1182 (Utah 2004). It is the solemn duty of the trial court to balance these
dual guarantees by ensuring that the defendant is exercising his right to selfrepresentation voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. See State v.
Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799 (Utah 1999)
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Mr. Ferretti did not request self-representation. His choice to proceed
to represent himself and answer the court's questions as to what grounds he
had to withdraw his plea was not made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently. The trial court simply forced him to immediately set forth
legal grounds as to why his plea should be withdrawn. Mr. Ferretti did not
have any legal training. His plea remained in the timeframe permitting
withdrawal. He had not been sentenced yet. The plea statement incorrectly
stated he still could file a motion to withdraw his plea (30) days after
sentencing. R-281. While the trial court may have been upset that Mr.
Ferretti was requesting that his plea should be withdrawn, the court still
should not have deprived him of due process by not granting a continuance
and the right to counsel by making him argue the motion without allowing
his court-appointed attorney's time to prepare. In Becker v. Sunset City, 216
P.3d 367 (UT App. 2009) the court stated,
Due process, at a minimum, requires timely "notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the
case," Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).
Accord In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 877 (Utah 1996)
("[T]o satisfy due process, a hearing must be prefaced by
timely notice[.]ff) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). For notice to satisfy due process requirements,
it must be "reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections" and "a reasonable time . . . to
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make their appearance." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 70
S.Ct. 652.

It is possible the trial court was upset because Defendant waited until
the day of sentencing to move to withdraw his plea. Still, Defendant was
within the time frame allowed to withdraw a plea and his attorneys' should
have been given opportunity to prepare and argue the motion. The trial court
erred when it denied the continuance and made the defendant act as his own
attorney.
III. DID THE STATE VIOLATE THE PLEA AGREEMENT WHEN
THEY FAILED TO WRITE A TIMELY LETTER TO THE BOARD OF
PARDONS TO RECOMMEND THE BOARD OF PARDONS CONSIDER
THE FACT MR. FERRETTI PLEAD GUILTY IN EVALUATING HIS
RELEASE DATE?
The appellant agrees that this issue was not preserved below and
asks the Court to consider this issue under the exceptional circumstance
exception to the requirement that issues be preserved from the trial court. A
part of the facts regarding this issue were not discovered until after the
defendant had been sentenced. State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, f 18,122 P.3d
566 (recognizing three circumstances where an issue may be addressed for
the first time on appeal: plain error, exceptional circumstances, and
ineffective assistance of counsel).
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As part of the plea agreement entered into on January 11, 2010 the
State agreed to write a letter to the Board asking them to consider the fact he
pled guilty to murder as mitigation in considering his eventual release. R281:4. The defendant's initial review before the board was on March 1.
2010. see addendum "A" This was three months after the State made the
agreement. The Board never received the letter until July 6, 2010. The
letter was untimely. The appellants brief was initially due prior to this date.
This violation constitutes a breach of the plea agreement and the remedy
should be withdrawal of the defendant's plea.
A defendant who pleads guilty has a constitutional right to a remedy
when a plea agreement is broken. See State v. Smit, 95 P.3d 1202 (UT
2004), State v. Felder, 2007 UT App 172. The remedy the defendant is
seeking is withdrawal of his plea.
In State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988), State v. Bero, 645
P.2d 44 (Utah 1982) State v. Norris, 2002 UT App 305, the court held that in
these types of cases the guilty plea is involuntary and withdrawal of the plea
is the proper remedy. If the defendant pleads guilty with exaggerated belief
in the benefits of his plea.. .he should be allowed to withdraw his plea,,
Copeland at 1275. The defendant must be allowed to withdraw his plea if
the State made a promise it did not or could not fulfill. Id at 1276.
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The State failed to write the letter in a timely manner to the Board of
Pardons and Parole. The Board did not receive the letter until July 6, 2010
almost three months after the initial parole screening hearing which set Mr.
Ferretti's parole hearing date and six months after they agreed to do so. The
original hearing was held March 1, 2010. See Addendum A The impact of
the letter to the Board will never be known because they did not receive it in
a timely manner. The defendant relied upon the letter when he entered his
plea. He should be able to withdraw his plea because the state failed to write
the letter in a timely manner thus violating the plea agreement. Furthermore,
the defendant may have had an exaggerated belief the benefit the letter
would have upon the Board.
CONCULSION
The appellant hereby requests that the Court allow his plea to be
withdrawn. He has shown that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily
made. He did not understand that he was admitting to all the elements of the
crime. He does not admit that he knowingly and intentionally took the life
of the victim. The trial court should have never accepted the plea absence a
complete admission and understanding by the defendant of the elements.
Furthermore, the trial court did not strictly comply with Rule 11. The Court

never asked him if he understood that by pleading guilty he was admitting to
all the elements of the crime.
The appellants due process and sixth amendment rights were violated
when his attorney's were not given adequate time to file a formal motion and
memorandum to withdraw his plea. The defendant was forced to act as his
own attorney in articulating a good faith basis to as to why his plea should
be withdrawn.
The State breached the plea agreement with the defendant by failing
to write a timely letter to the board. The defendant had an exaggerated
belief that the plea bargain would benefit him more.
Dated this

7

day of October, 2010

MI
David M. Pemf
Attorney for WQ Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify, that I mailed two copies of the above and foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLANT and a digital copy, postage prepaid to the
Attorney General's Office, 160 East 300 South, 5th floor, P.O. Box 140814,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814
DATED this 9

day of October, 2010.
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Offender # 195065
Consideration of the Status of Robert Warren Ferretti

USP #

ADMIN REVIEW TO SET OH DATE
After a review of the submitted information and good cause appearing, the Board makes the following decision and order:
Results
1. ORIGINAL HEARING

Effective Date
3/1/2034

Hearing Notes
1. Schedule for an Original Hearing In 03/2034.
No Crime
1. MURDER

Sent
15-100

_ Ease No,
091100312

Judge
"" ALLEN

Expiration
3/14/2109

This decision is subject to review and modification by the Board of Pardons at any time until actual releasefromcustody.
By order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this date 28th day of April, 2010, affixed my signature as
Chairman for and on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons.
- £ ^ ^ 3 ^ ^ ^ ^
Curtis L. Gamer, Chairman

pending on the parole or probation; is that correct?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes.

All right.

Do you understand that under

a plea of guilty, the Judge may ask you questions about the
offense, and I will, and that you admitted to your
participation in the crime; do you understand that?
MR. FERRETTI:

Yes.

I!m going to review the agreement that

THE COURT:

you've entered into with the State.

The State will drop--the

State will drop all pending counts in the Information against
you except for murder.

The State agrees that sentencing can

take place at any time, at the time of your plea, which would
be today and will move the Court to impose a sentence of
incarceration at the Utah State Prison of 15 years to life.
That in exchange, the State will write a letter to the parole
board with the following language:

We would ask the Parole

Board to consider the defendant's willingness to plead guilty
to murder as mitigation in considering his eventual release.
And finally, that the State will request myself to
make the same recommendation; however, you understand that I
cannot be bound by any sentencing agreement of the parties?
Do you understand that, Mr. Ferretti?
MR. FERRETTI:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

All right.

The factual basis of your guilty plea is
10
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BOARD OF PARDONS

June 23,2010
Board of Pardons and Parole
448 East Winchester Street
Suite 300
Murray, UT 84107
RE: Robert Ferretti
Dear Members of Parole Board:
I am writing this letter as the Cache County Attorney on behalf of Robert Ferretti who is
currently incarcerated at the Utah State Prison. I believe that some positive consideration should
be given to Mr, Ferretti ai his parole hearing for his willingness to admit that he murdered
Tiffany Jarmon.
If you have any questions or concerns please feel free to contact me.
Sincerely,

^

^

James M. Swink
Cache County Attorney

